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Abstract
How should we determine which nations have a responsibility to remedy suffering elsewhere? The
problem is pressing because, following David Miller, ‘[it] is morally intolerable if (remediable)
suffering and deprivation are allowed to continue ...where they exist we are morally bound to hold
somebody (some person or collective agent) responsible for relieving them’. Miller offers a
connection theory of remedial responsibilities in response to this problem, a theory he has been
developing over the last decade. This theory is meant to serve as a guide on how we can best
determine which nations are remedially responsible for alleviating suffering and deprivation
elsewhere. Miller’s theory entails our following a procedure in order to determine remedial
responsibility for nations. The problem is that there is an important flaw in this procedure, a flaw
that previous critiques have overlooked. This essay will explain this flaw and how Miller’s theory
might be reformulated into a two-tiered procedure that would take better account of this problem.
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THE MORAL SIGNIFICANCE OF NATIONALISM
Miller’s connection theory rests on a particular understanding of global justice
and national responsibility that I will summarise. Miller argues that our nationality
may have moral significance. This will depend on whether our shared identity as
co-nationalssatisfiesthreetests.Thefirsttestisthatoursharedidentityasco-nationals
is intrinsically valuable. The second test is that our shared identity gives rise to special
duties to fellow compatriots. The third and final test is that our shared identity as co-
nationalsisnotpremisedontheunjusttreatmentofothers.Notallsharedidentitieswill
havemoralsignificance.Thesemaybeidentifiediftheyfailanyoneofthesethreetests.
For example, persons who have a shared identity as members of a white supremacist
community fail the first test. This is because their shared relationship as racists is not
intrinsically valuable. Similarly, persons sharing an identity as persons who enjoy
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195listening to music would fail the second test as no special duties arise from their shared
identity.
1
The third and final test requires more explanation. Consider the missing child case:a
child is missing and there are concerns for her safety.
2 We would have a duty to assist
any search and rescue efforts all things considered. Now consider the our missing child
case: a child is missing, there are concerns for her safety, and the child is our
daughter. It seems clear that we would likewise have a duty to assist in any search and
rescue efforts, although our duty is more compelling. Now consider a scenario where
we had to make choice and we may only choose to assist with the search and rescue
efforts for one of these two searches. We have an additional moral reason to assist the
search for our own child over the search for someone else’s child. We perform no
injustice to this other child because we do not treat him less than he deserves when
deciding to search for our own child given our morally significant relationship.
Likewise, we may assist co-nationals if we must choose between otherwise similarly
situated persons on account of the morally significant relationship we share with co-
nationals. Our nationality as a shared identity is not morally irrelevant provided it
satisfies the three test criteria.
NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND REMEDIAL RESPONSIBILITY
Miller argues that we can determine which nations are remedially responsible for
alleviating suffering elsewhere by way of his connection theory of remedial
responsibility. Perhaps controversially, he defends a view that nations may be held
responsible for collective actions as a group.
3 Nevertheless, nations may be found
remedially responsible after a consideration of their relation to six factors. We may be
remedially responsible even where we are not outcome responsible for suffering: our
focus is to determine which nation or nations should remedy suffering elsewhere
because there is a situation. Miller says:
that demands to be put right: it is morally unacceptable for people to be left in that
deprived or needy condition, and there is no overriding justification such as
that they are being fairly punished for some wrongful deed ...All that matters is
that we find it morally unacceptable if the deprived person is simply left to suffer.
4
A connection theory of remedial responsibility considers six factors. Its goal is to
determine what connections may exist between a nation and those in need elsewhere
in light of these six factors. Miller says: ‘The basic idea here is that A should be
considered remedially responsible for P’s condition when he is linked to P in one or
more ways’.
5 These factors and the questions they address are:
1. Causal responsibility. Was a nation causally responsible for bringing about
suffering and deprivation elsewhere?
6
2. Moral responsibility. Was a nation morally responsible for bringing about suffering
and deprivation elsewhere?
7
3. Capacity. Does a nation have the capacity to provide a remedy?
8
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suffering deprivation whether it be ‘ties of family or friendship, collegiality,
religion, nationality, and so forth’?
9
5. Outcome responsibility. Is the suffering and deprivation faced elsewhere a side
effect of any nation’s activities?
10
6. Benefit.
11 Did a nation benefit from the suffering and deprivation elsewhere even
if the former played no causal role in the latter?
12
Millerarguesthatthesedifferentfactors,whenconsideredtogether,helpusdetermine
the remedial responsibilities of nations. We consider each nation with a view to any
possibleconnectionsthroughthesesixfactors.Millersaysthat‘[w]ehavetorelyonour
intuitions about the relative importance of different sources of connection’.
13 We
intuitively balance the relative weights of the various connections that may exist
betweenanationandthoseinneedelsewhere.Thisproceduremaybeabitopaque,but
several considerations are clear. One is that each factor carries equal weight and none
have priority over others. The fact that one factor is present in one case, but absent in
another does not trump any factor in favour of another.
SHOULD ALL FACTORS BE WEIGHED EQUALLY?
Miller argues that these factors weigh equally. This may appear problematic. For
example, consider a case where Nation A is morally responsible for suffering and
deprivation elsewhere and Nation B is causally responsible for suffering and
deprivation elsewhere. We may think that Nation A will possess more remedial
responsibility than Nation B because their responsibility has greater weight. Miller
appears to offer sympathetic words in this direction, such as where he argues that
‘I assume ... that negative duties weigh more heavily than positive ones’.
14 This
would suggest that my nation’s negative duty to avoid being morally responsible for
causing harm to others a more weighty factor than, say, a second nation’s lacking any
responsibility (causal, moral or outcome) for deprivation elsewhere, but possessing
capacity.
We may respond that there may be situations where negative duty considerations
weigh more heavily on our judgements. Consider the following:
Nation A is morally responsible for severe poverty in Nation X.
Nation B enjoys a benefit from Nation X’s severe poverty. Nation B lacks causal,
moral, or outcome responsibility for severe poverty in Nation X.
Nation C shares a border with Nation X. Nation C enjoys no benefit from Nation X’s
severe poverty. Nation C lacks causal, moral, or outcome responsibility for severe
poverty in Nation X.
Our intuitive response may be to say that the remedial responsibilities for these
nations A, B, and C look like this:
Nation ANation BNation C.
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responsibility. This speaks to the greater weight we have often given to negative
duties over positive duties. Nation B is less remedially responsible because it merely
benefited from the misfortune of Nation X without being involved in bringing about
its misfortune. However, Nation B is more remedially responsible than Nation C
because the former does enjoy a benefit at the expense of Nation X however,
inadvertent; Nation C merely shares a border.
This scenario would appear to suggest a rank ordering of factors whereby those
more closely linked with negative duties have priority over others, but this is false
and it is central to Miller’s argument. It is important to recall that the purpose of
Miller’s connection theory of remedial responsibility is to help us determine which
nation or nations should provide remedy to others. What matters is that we have a
procedure by which at least one or more nation(s) can provide remedy: we must find
some agent responsible to remedy suffering elsewhere if this suffering is morally
intolerable.
There is no rank ordering of factors for Miller. The six connections offer different
considerations of possible linkages between nations. It is not the number of
connections that one nation has with others, but the strength of any connections
on balance all things considered. While we may give weight to moral responsibilities
arising from any negative duties, we should not prioritise any one connection
over any others. Moreover, the connections are different in character. Miller says:
‘[t]he nature of the link varies greatly: in some cases ... it provides a substantive
moral reason for holding A remedially responsible, whereas in others it simply picks
A out as salient for non-moral reasons’.
15 We should consider moral and non-moral
factors (such as capacity) in determining remedial responsibilities.
We might argue that the fact of this difference gives sufficient reason to prioritise
some connections over others. For example, we may be tempted to favour
connections that provide substantive moral reasons over those that do not. Miller
rejects this view. He says:
We might think, therefore, that some forms of connection should always be given
priority over others; I shall argue, however, against this. The point to bear in mind is
that the weight of justification is borne by the pressing need to relieve P, and the
necessity of identifying a particular agent as having the obligation to provide the
relief. The fact that some of the links appear morally flimsy when taken by
themselves matters less when this point is grasped.
16
No one connection has greater weight over any other connection. We are to consider
the full range of any connections a nation may have with others. The purpose is to
best identify the nation or nations with remedial responsibilities.
Consider the drowning child. Suppose someone pushes a child into a river. It may
be tempting to believe that this person should save the child because of his moral
responsibility. However, Miller warns that moral responsibility comes in degrees and
other possible connections may trump:
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them deliberately. Are we to say that a careless pusher who is also a weak swimmer
should be held responsible for the rescue in preference to the lifeguard who can
make the rescue easily and safely? Getting P out of the river seems more important
here than enforcing the moral responsibility of the pusher.
17
Moral responsibility is one connection amongst others. We consider the possible
remedial responsibilities of agents in terms of the connections they may have on
balance. Note that those agents who perhaps morally ought to provide rescue may not
possess remedial responsibilities. The careless pusher may be morally responsible for
pushing the child into the river, but moral responsibility may be insufficient to justify
his possessing remedial responsibilities. This is especially true where the careless
pusher is unable to make the rescue easily or safely. Thus, the fact that he ought to
provide rescue does not assume he can or that he has remedial responsibilities.
THE PRIORITY OF REMEDY
Consider the Evil Nation. This is a nation that desires to create severe poverty
however, it can, but it lacks the ability to remedy the damage it creates.
18 Thus,
remedial responsibilities will always fall to other nations despite the fact that the Evil
Nation possesses causal, moral, and outcome responsibility, it may further benefit in
the delight that spreading severe poverty brings to its citizens and enjoy membership
in particular communities of nations that are its targets. Thus, it may satisfy strong
connections among five of Miller’s six factors, but nevertheless it can never be held
remedially responsible because the Evil Nation lacks any capacity to provide remedy
to the destruction it directs.
The problem I intend to highlight with this example is not the problem of holding
nations remedially responsible. Miller’s focus is on suffering and deprivation existent
now and how we might determine which nations should be selected to address this
problem. The Evil Nation example is clearly fictional. If it were to become a reality,
then procedures may be put in place to provide sufficient disincentives to prevent the
birth of any such nations.
Instead, the Evil Nation example highlights an important flaw in Miller’s
connection theory of remedial responsibility that other commentators have over-
looked.
19 Miller claims that each of the six factors possesses equal weight. This is
false. One factor does carry more weight than the others: this factor is capacity. The
evidence for this problem is clear: if a nation lacks sufficient capacity, then it can never be
held remedially responsible. Miller wants to provide a procedure to determine which
nation or nations may be held remedially responsible. The problem is that he fails to
recognise that whether or not a nation is held remedially responsible rests upon a
consideration of whether this nation possesses any capacity to provide remedy.
Consider the Evil Nation. It lacks any capacity to provide a remedy. While it may
possess moral or causal responsibility in abundance, the strength of any other factor
beyond capacity is irrelevant where capacity is wholly lacking. The reason is simple: if
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to weigh other considerations of various factors concerning its possible remedial
responsibilities if only this nation had sufficient capacity.
20 A nation without capacity
is unable to possess remedial responsibilities no matter its other connections. The
situation is opposite where capacity is present. The nation that has the capacity but
may not be morally responsible or merely a neighbour nevertheless has the capacity
to provide a remedy. The ability to provide a remedy is central to the possibility of
possessing a remedial responsibility. Miller is mistaken to argue that the six factors
carry equal weight because it would have us consider nations lacking any capacity for
assignment of remedial responsibilities.
Miller should correct his connection theory of remedial responsibility. He should
not claim that his six factors possess equal weight. Instead, he should accept a two-
tiered procedure asking different questions. The first tier would ask which nations
possess capacity. The purpose of this exercise is to focus our attention upon those
nations with the capacity to possess remedial responsibilities. It is a mistake to do
otherwise. If our project is to offer a method whereby we may determine the nation or
nations that should provide remedy to others, then surely our first task is to single out
those nations that may provide any remedy. We should then select a nation or nations
from this pool of nations capable of being remedially responsible according to Miller’s
criteria.
Indeed, Miller offers various suggestions in this direction, such as:
One obvious way of identifying an agent who can be held responsible for bringing
relief to P is to establish who is capable of supplying the remedy ...The rationale
for this criterion is evident: since the whole purpose of identifying remedial
responsibilities is to get help to P, picking the agent who is actually able to provide
that help makes obvious sense.
21
Perhaps surprisingly, this does not lead Miller to argue*as he should have
argued*that we first consider which nations are capable of providing remedial
responsibilities and then we weigh the six connecting factors amongst these remaining
nations. He uses the example of who should save a person thrown into a river: should
it be the person morally responsible, someone who is not responsible but a strong
swimmer or someone else?
22 Thus, why not say a strong swimmer (with capacity)
should remedy the situation even if he were not responsible for the problem faced?
Miller says: ‘Getting P out of the river seems more important here than enforcing the
moral responsibility of the pusher’.
23
This is incompatible with two deeply held positions. One position is that each factor
is weighted equally, which we have already discussed. If all were equally weighty, then
we may find a nation remedially responsible where any one factor or more were
lacking. The problem here is that if a nation lacked any capacity to provide remedy
then it could never be held remedially responsible. Therefore, remedy provides an
important threshold that any nation must satisfy in order to be considered remedially
responsible. The second position is ‘[a]s far as I can see, there is no algorithm that
could resolve such disputes. We have to rely on our intuitions about the relative
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24 This is incorrect. We should rely on
our intuitive judgements weighing the connections between a nation and others
against a criteria, but only after we have determined whether a nation may be
remedially responsible. There is an algorithm after all: first, we should determine
which nations may be held remedially responsible and, second, we then weigh the six
factors against our commonsense morality to determine remedial responsibilities for
nations but amongst nations that may provide remedies.
CONCLUSION
Miller offers a connection theory of remedial responsibility. It offers us a procedure
we can use to determine which nation or nations should be held responsible for
remedying the suffering and deprivation elsewhere. The problem with this procedure
is Miller’s insistence that the six factors we should use to intuitively weigh any
nation’s connection with those suffering deprivation elsewhere are equal and do not
trump other factors. The problem is that this view rests on an important mistake.
This mistake is that a nation’s capacity to provide remedy has priority. If a nation
lacks any capacity, then it never matters how many nor how well other connections
may relate to this nation because it could never be held remedially responsible.
The recommended correction is that Miller develops a two-tiered procedure. First,
we single out all nations that possess sufficient capacity. Secondly, we consider the
intuitive weight of the various connections held between only those nations possession
capacityandthosenationssufferingfromdeprivation.Thismayofferastraightforward
correction of Miller’s position, but one that would benefit its wider acceptability.
Miller’s connection theory of remedial responsibility would benefit greatly by shifting
from the view that all six factors should be weighed equally to the view that while no
factor may hold greater weight than others beyond a threshold, it is first necessary to
makethisdeterminationamongstnationswithsufficientcapacity.Whereanationlacks
any capacity, this nation can never possess remedial responsibilities whatever the
relative weight of other connections.
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